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INTRODUCTION 
The major concern of this essay is the subject/predicate 
analysis of propositions. 
When I say "lli subject/predicate analysis" I do not assume 
(what is false) that there is just one such analysis; rather, I 
assume that there is one version of this analysis widely current in 
contemporary philosophy. It is the analysis of singular 
propositions into referring components and non-referring components. 
This conception of the subject/predicate distinction is exception-
ally imprecise, but is not completely uninformative. We do have 
a rough idea of what it is to refer to something and an intuitive 
conception of which propositional components we use as devices of 
reference and which ones we do not. And this gives us an 
embryonic conception of what the subject/predicate analysis looks 
like. 
For the most part I will be working from this intuitive 
starting point (which does not, of course, rule out the drawing 
of counter-intuitive conclusions). And since this conception 
of the analysis is the received one in contemporary philosophy, 
my argument may be said to have a built-in conservative bias 
(which will make any radical conclusions all the more interesting). 
My major concern will be with singular propositions, that is, 
with those propositions to which the above conception seems to 
ap:;1ly :t:airly straightforwardly. I share the common assumption 
that it is in terms of an analysis of singular propositions that 
we must turn to the analysis of general propositions, i.e. that 
the former are logically or analytically prior to the latter. 
My first chapter will be concerned with Frege, and forms 
an exception to the above statement of methodological stance. 
For, while generally I assume that the notion of reference and the 
notion of a logical subject go together, this assumption would 
clearly be out of place in a discussion of Frege, who argued or 
assumed that the notion of reference applies equally to the two 
2. 
components of his analysis. And, since his analysis (into 'proper 
name' and 'concept expression') is clearly in the same line of 
business as the subject/predicate analysis with which I am concerned, 
Chapter I is a convenient place to consider, and, hopefully, to 
reject, his alternative conception of that analysis. 
In the following chapters I deal with definite descriptions 
(roughly, expressions of the form "the so and so11 ), proper names, 
and indexical expressions, all of which are, on an intuitive 
conception, 'referring expressions' and thus prima facie candidates 
for the role of logical subjects of those propositions in which 
they occur. It will not, I think, spoil any surprise endings if 
I say now that definite descriptions fail, and proper names and 
indexical expressions pass, the tests for successful candidature. 
The notion of identity raises its head in the chapter on proper 
names, and some of the issues are discussed in the next chapter 
which is devoted solely to that topic. In the final chapter, I 
combine a consideration of indexical reference with an attempt 
to draw some conclusions from what has gone before, I do not, 
however, place very much importance on these conclusions, What 
is more important is the question of how one (or I) would continue 
the line of argument and inquiry which forms the body of this 
thesis (into, e.g., the analysis of general propositions, the 
notion of quantification, etc,). Conclusions stated at the 
stage which I reach in this essay can only be promissory notes 
uttered in very uncertain times, and of negligible cash value. 
Of the indefinitely large number of caveats which I might 
offer at this stage, one stands out. I have talked and will 
talk about the subject/predicate analysis of propositions. 1 There 
is a difficulty here in that if one conceives of propositions 
1. Except in the immediately following chapter, where I am 
discussing Frege. Since his terminology is important, I here 
p~y lip-service to his view that notions of truth and falsity 
attach to the sentence via the 'Thought•. 
(i.e. those items of which truth and falsity can be predicated) 
as non-linguistic items, it is hard to defend the practice by 
which one gives linguistic items (e.g. referring expressions) as 
their components. In fact, I have in this essay adopted the 
practice without defending it; I simply assume that the sentence/ 
proposition relationship is such that one can talk of parts of 
sentences as if they were propositional components. How one 
could justify this procedure (without adopting the view - which 
I think to be false - that propositions ~ sentences) I do not 
know. 
